The Internet and the Frankenstein Problem

Andrew Guzman compares International Organizations to Frankenstein's monster—creations that can grow beyond their creators' control. States, fearing this loss of control, often design conservative IOs, limiting their autonomy and potentially, effectiveness. When reading this piece, I found this "Frankenstein problem" useful in identifying similarities with internet governance, where states and involved stakeholders also struggle to balance control and freedom. The core issue in both cases is determining how much governance is required to provide enough autonomy for them to function effectively, but not too much that they become uncontrollable.

Part 1: Frankenstein

The Frankenstein metaphor can help shed light on the functioning of IOs and internet law. While I have identified four sets of similarities, it is evident that they can be contested, and many others could be elaborated.

1. Sovereignty and Jurisdiction

The internet challenges traditional sovereignty, as states have to navigate controlling their digital spaces while dealing with the borderless nature of cyberspace. In the same manner, IOs often encounter resistance from states concerned about preserving their autonomy and sovereignty.

2. Multistakeholder Governance

Global cooperation between governments, private companies, and civil societies is essential to manage issues like cybersecurity and privacy. Much like the role of tech companies and NGOs in internet governance, organizations like the UN and the World Bank also rely on states and non-state actors to shape their policies.

3. Informality in Lawmaking

As discussed in Joost Pauwelyn’s ‘Informal International Lawmaking’, internet governance can also rely on informal lawmaking through norms and guidelines rather than exclusively by binding treaties. Similarly, IOs utilize informal processes and can act as “norm entrepreneurs”, producing non-binding recommendations to respond to global crises.

4. Evolving Global Governance

The digital world is constantly evolving, requiring governance systems to adapt to new technologies like AI and changing security concerns.  IOs must also evolve in relation with global issues like climate change and pandemics, requiring continuous updates to international laws and practices.

Part 2: Controlling the Monster

The question of “who controls the monster” mirrors the debate over IOs and provides a useful framework for understanding common challenges. The heart of the Frankenstein problem lies in balancing autonomy and control, striking the right balance between autonomy and control and ensuring these institutions can address global issues without becoming unmanageable. The multistakeholder model, (focusing on the World Summit on Information Society 2003-05) is useful in distributing governance among governments, civil society, and private actors, much like IOs are intertwined and in constant interaction with states, NGOs, civil societies etc. This metaphor is also useful in analyzing “how we can control the monster”, and the role that international law plays in IOs and internet regulations. On the one hand, international law is useful on setting limits on IOs powers and responsibilities, similar to the regulations set in internet governance. However, while it can provide a framework for controlling these entities, its effectiveness can be limited by its generalizability and potential bias, usually serving as a tool for maintaining global hierarchies.

The Frankenstein problem reveals how IOs and internet governance face similar challenges in terms of who and how we can control our creations. Rather than fearing the unknown and avoiding the monster like Frankestein did, we should engage with it and work together to harness its potential for good.

Author: Arianna

Date: 2024

Note: This essay was written during my time at the Geneva Graduate Institute.